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A B S T R A C T
In some accountability regimes, teachers pay more attention to higher achieving students at the expense of lower
achieving students. The overall goal of this study is to examine, in this type of accountability regime, the impacts
of a pay-for-percentile type scheme in which incentives exist for all students but which are larger for improving
the achievement of lower achieving students. Analyzing data from a large-scale randomized experiment in rural
China, we find that incentives improve average achievement by 0.10 SDs and the achievement of low-achieving
students by 0.15 SDs. We find parallel changes in teacher behavior and curricular coverage. Taken together, the
results demonstrate that incentive schemes can effectively address teacher neglect of low-achieving students.
1. Introduction
Teacher effort is key for improving student achievement (Klem and
Connell, 2004; Brophy and Thomas, 1984). Yet under the current tea-
cher evaluation system in rural China, teachers tend to overlook low-
achieving students while paying relatively more attention to high-
achieving students (Bo et al., 2010; Li, 2014). According to one survey
conducted in rural China, only 21.6% of low-achieving students re-
ported receiving help from their teachers, compared to 83.4 percent of
high-achieving students (Wang and Yu, 2011). Such teacher neglect can
stifle classroom engagement and affect the learning of disaffected stu-
dents (Furrer C et al., 2014). Additionally, in the longer term, students
with lower levels of academic achievement have lower levels of edu-
cational attainment and a higher risk of mental health problems
(Yi et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2015; Chang et al., 2016). In other words,
low-achieving students are neglected, with long-lasting negative effects.
Why do teachers in rural China neglect low-achieving students in
particular? One reason may be that the educational system in China is
extremely competitive and exam-oriented. At the junior high school
level, high school entrance exam scores and the rate of matriculation
into academic high school are metrics that are often used for evaluating
teaching effectiveness (Li, 2008). In such a system, focusing on mid-
and high-performing students offers teachers the prospect of greater
rewards with less effort than would be needed to raise the scores of low-
performing students. While matriculation from primary school to junior
high school today is not dependent on test scores, there is a widespread
culture among primary and secondary schools that rewards teachers for
identifying high performing students and focusing on test scores (CPG,
2006; Jiang, 2011). As a result, even in elementary schools, teachers
usually pay more attention to the top and middle performing students;
in contrast, relatively low-performing students are ignored (Jiang and
Xu, 2016; Bo and Wu, 2010; Li, 2014).
Recent curriculum reforms have called on educators to shift their
focus away from exam-driven education and towards more quality-
driven education (MOE, 2010). In 2009, China's Ministry of Education
implemented the Teacher Performance Pay policy (MOE, 2008). This
policy mandates that 30 percent of the salaries of teachers be perfor-
mance pay, which means that 30 percent of a teacher's salary is sup-
posed to be directly dependent on the academic performance of that
teacher's students. The stated goals of the policy are to incentivize
teachers to work harder to improve student outcomes and to care for
every student, especially poorly performing students (MOE, 2008).
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However, despite the intention of this policy, little has changed
regarding teacher performance in rural China (Fu and Fan, 2013;
Ren and Luo, 2015). In the recent literature, even among schools that
claimed to have implemented performance-related pay schemes, tea-
chers tend to receive equal amounts of extra pay regardless of perfor-
mance (Mi and Dai, 2011; Ren and Luo, 2015; Loyalka, Sylvia, Liu, Chu
& Shi, 2019). This means that although the pay-for-performance policy
has been nominally implemented, few schools are actually paying for
performance. Recent studies also have shown that teachers in the cur-
rent education system are still highly concerned about exam scores and
matriculation of their students to higher levels of schooling (Chen and
Feng, 2013; Chen and Wu, 2016; Ning, 2015), which reinforces the
neglect of underperforming students (Yuhua, 2018).
One reason that this policy has been less effective than intended may
be that it does not include a specific performance assessment scheme to
determine performance pay or to incentivize teachers to exert greater ef-
fort towards students, especially low-performing students (Fan and
Fu, 2011; Mi and Dai, 2011; Ren and Luo, 2015). In China's decentralized
education system, each school (or each set of schools in a school district or
county) determines on its own how to comply with the new policy. Re-
search from the United States suggests that when local school districts and
educators are tasked with designing performance pay schemes, they tend
to imprement relatively weak, egalitarian reward structures that do not
incentivize behavior change (Springer & Taylor, 2016; Marsh, Springer,
McCaffrey, Yuan & Epstein, 2011). It is certainly possible that schools
districts in China would do the same. It is also possible that districts may
completely ignore the new incentive component. Considering that many
schools have implemented the policy in name only, it is likely that many
schools that say they are implementing the policy have not incorporated
any rigorous performance assessment into the pay structure. The result of
such a system would tend to reinforce the status quo, where low-achieving
students are not given the help they need (Mi and Dai, 2011; Jiang et al.,
2016; Ma, 2011).
What kind of targeted pay-for-performance scheme may successfully
incentivize teachers to allocate effort to all student outcomes, including
the outcomes of low-achieving students? According to (Neal, 2011), how
student outcomes are used to measure teacher performance and mapped
onto teacher rewards will affect the effort that teachers apply toward
improving student outcomes within the classroom. For example, schemes
involving fixed performance targets may fail to motivate teachers who
believe that targets are too easy or too difficult to achieve (Neal and
Schanzenbach, 2010; Springer et al., 2010). In contrast, competitive
performance schemes in which teachers are evaluated relative to the
performance of teachers with similar types of students and qualifications
may more effectively motivate teachers to improve student learning
outcomes (Neal, 2011; Barlevy and Neal, 2012). The design of perfor-
mance assessments within an incentive scheme may also impact where
teachers direct their effort – that is, which students teachers choose to
focus on (Neal, 2011; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010).
Recent empirical literature has tested Neal's theory in developing
country contexts like that of rural China. Loyalka et al. (2019) compare
the impacts of three different randomly-assigned teacher incentive
schemes (levels, gains, and pay-for-percentile incentives), against a
pure control group, on the achievement outcomes of students in rural
China.1 They find that of the three incentive schemes studied, only the
pay-for-percentile incentive has a significant impact on student
achievement. In addition, pay-for-percentile incentives lead to similar
size gains for all students across the baseline achievement distribution,
including students who are traditionally neglected. Mbiti, Romero and
Schipper (2018) compare pay-for-percentile teacher incentives, an in-
centive scheme with several “levels” thresholds, and a pure control
group in grades one to three in Tanzania. They find that both incentive
schemes improve average student achievement, but do not result in
statistically different results. Gilligan, Karachiwalla, Kasirye, Lucas and
Neal (2018) similarly find that pay-for-percentile incentives, in com-
bination with textbooks and grade-appropriate tests, improve the
average math performance of primary school students in Uganda re-
lative to a pure control group.
Despite the insights gained from this literature, important questions
remain. First and foremost, given that lower achieving students receive
disproportionately less attention than higher achieving ones, and that
lower achieving student have difficulty catching up to their higher
performing peers, can teacher incentives be designed to promote larger
learning gains among lower achieving students? Additionally, how well
do performance pay incentives (like pay-for-percentile) interact with
existing incentives around teacher promotion? Prior international re-
search suggests that new teachers and teachers with lower base salaries
are more likely to support incentive pay schemes. Studies in the United
States have found that teachers with less than three years of experience
express substantially more support for incentive pay than teachers with
more than 20 years of experience (Ballou and Podgursky, 1993;
Goldhaber et al., 2011; Jacob and Springer, 2008; Muralidharan and
Sundararaman, 2011). Furthermore, a study in India found that tea-
chers with higher base pay are significantly less likely to support the
idea of pay for performance than those with lower base pay
(Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011). In China, teacher promotions
(which result in permanent base salary increases) are tied to both
teaching experience and student performance (Rivkin, Hanushek &
Kain, 2005; Karachiwalla and Park, 2017). It is therefore possible that
teachers with different levels of experience or base salary may respond
differently to performance pay incentives.
The overall goal of this study is to examine the impacts of pay-for-
percentile incentives on the academic performance of students in rural
China, focusing on the outcomes of low-achieving students. First, we
analyze the impact of a modified pay-for-percentile teacher incentive
scheme that provides even more money for achievement gains among
the bottom third of students in the baseline achievement distribution)
on overall student achievement. Second, we examine differences in the
impact of the incentive scheme on students who scored in the top,
middle and bottom terciles of the achievement distribution at baseline.
Third, we analyze the mechanisms through which the modified pay-for
percentile incentive scheme affects student achievement. Finally, we
examine the heterogeneous effects of the scheme for teachers with
different levels of experience and monthly base salary.
To meet these objectives, we conduct a full-scale randomized con-
trolled trial (RCT) of pay-for-percentile incentives in a subset of the
rural elementary schools that participated in Loyalka et al. (2019)’s
study. Grade 5 math teachers in 103 schools were assigned to either the
control group, which awarded performance pay based on the school's
preexisting evaluation system, or the treatment group, which used the
pay-for-percentile method to evaluate and reward teacher perfor-
mance.2 We examine the impacts of the modified pay-for-percentile
incentive on treatment students as compared to the control group.
Additionally, we compare the secondary outcomes (student attitudes
towards math and teaching practices of teachers) between the control
and treatment groups to understand the mechanisms through which the
pay-for-percentile incentives impact student achievement. Finally, we
1 The first scheme (the “levels” incentive) evaluates teachers based on the
class average of student scores on a standardized exam at the end of the school
year. The second scheme (the “gains” incentive) evaluates teachers based on the
class average gain in student achievement from the start to the end of the school
year. The third scheme, (the “pay-for-percentile” incentive), which is based on
the incentive design of Barlevy and Neal (2012), evaluates teachers based on
the fraction of contests that students of a given teacher win when compared to
students who are taught by other teachers and yet began the school year at
similar achievement level. All three schemes use a competitive rank-order
tournament to determine the reward each teacher receives.
2 Our study begins at the conclusion of Loyalka et al.’s study (2019), after the
grade 6 teachers in that study received incentive payments.
2. Methods
To analyze the impact of a modified pay-for-percentile teacher in-
centive scheme on student outcomes, we implemented a clustered
randomized controlled trial (RCT) among 3,789 grade five students in
103 public primary schools located in rural northwest China. This trial
lasted for the duration of the 2014-2015 academic year. The schools
included in this study are the same as the pay-for-percentile treatment
schools (hereafter “treatment schools”) and control schools included in
Loyalka et al. (2019)’s study. However, it should be noted that, while
the treatment and control schools are the same, our sample is comprised
of a new cohort of students and teachers. This means that, although the
treatment school teachers had not participated in the previous treat-
ment, they were aware of the pay-for-percentile program that was of-
fering (and paying out) incentive payments. In other words, there is
reason to believe that the new cohort of teachers may have had higher
levels of trust in the program and the rewards that were offered by the
research team. In the following subsections, we describe in detail our
sampling process, treatment and control group assignment, interven-
tion design, balance and attrition, data collection, and the analytical
methods used in this paper.
2.1. Sampling frame and group assignment
A three-step strategy was used to select the sample. In the first step,
at the start of the Loyalka et al. (2019) study, one rural prefecture in
Province A and one rural prefecture in Province B were selected for the
study. The average per capita income of rural residents is $1,278 (RMB
8,687) in the sample prefecture in Province A and $645 (RMB 4,386) in
the sample prefecture in Province B (NBS, 2014). Since both of these are
lower than the $1,316 (RMB 8,896) national average per capita income
of rural areas across China (NBS, 2014), the sample provinces/pre-
fectures can therefore be viewed as characteristic of low-income rural
areas across China. From within the two sample prefectures, 16 na-
tionally-designated poverty counties were selected for inclusion in the
study.
In the second step, all elementary schools in the sample counties for
which official records could be obtained were identified, totaling 435
schools. Schools that were located in county or prefecture seats of
government were excluded, since most students in such schools are
urban residents. Schools with less than 90 students were also excluded,
since there was a likelihood that such schools would be shut down as
part of China's ongoing school merger program (Chen et al., 2014).
After applying these exclusion criteria, there were 216 elementary
schools left in the sample. In Loyalka et al. (2019)’s study, the 216
schools were randomized into three groups, including 52 control
schools, 54 “levels” incentive schools, 56 “gains” incentive schools, and
54 “pay-for-percentile” incentive schools. In our study, we excluded
schools that were included in the levels and gains incentive groups and
include only the pay-for-percentile treatment and pure control schools.
This left us with a final total of 103 schools, including 52 schools in the
treatment group and 51 schools in the control group. Typical of rural
China (Zhihui and Yuyou, 2016), the primary schools in the sample
were public schools, comprised of grades 1-6, and had an average of
close to 200 students.
In the third step of our sampling protocol, at the baseline of the
present study, we selected sample students and teachers. We selected all
grade 5 classes within each school for inclusion in our sample. All math
teachers of the students in the sample classes were also included. In
both Loyalka et al (2019) and our present study, all teachers in the same
school were assigned to the same treatment or control group. In total,
our sample included 3,789 fifth-grade students and 113 teachers in 103
schools, including 1,825 fifth-grade students and 57 teachers from the
52 treatment schools and 1,964 fifth-grade students and 56 teachers
from the 51 control schools (Table 1). In Loyalka et al. (2019), at
baseline (one year before the baseline of this study), the two sets of
schools were balanced in terms of 16 control variables.
2.2. Data collection
We conducted a baseline and endline survey of all students, teachers
and principals in our 103 sample schools. The baseline survey was
conducted in September 2014, after which we began our intervention.
The endline survey was conducted in September 2015, after the con-
clusion of the intervention. Although the content of the surveys was
slightly different at baseline and endline, students, teachers and prin-
cipals in both the treatment and control groups took the same survey
during a given survey wave.
The baseline and endline surveys consisted of three blocks. In the
first block, we collected data on student academic achievement. At both
baseline and endline, students were given 30 min standardized
mathematics tests that were constructed by trained psychometricians.
The baseline math test had test items that were appropriate for the start
of fifth grade whereas the endline math test had test items that were
appropriate for the start of sixth grade. Test items for both the baseline
and endline tests were selected from the standardized mathematics
curricula for primary school students in the two sample provinces, and
the content validity of these test items was checked by experts from the
local school systems. To prevent cheating, members of the research
team proctored the exams. Test scores were normalized into z-scores by
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation (SD) of the
control group's test score distribution.
In the second block, we collected data on student secondary out-
comes, including student attitudes towards math and teacher teaching
practices. In both the baseline and endline survey, students were asked
detailed questions covering their attitudes about math (math self-con-
cept, math anxiety, and math intrinsic and instrumental motivation
scales) as well as the classroom practices of their teachers (teaching
behavior, teacher care, classroom management ability, teacher com-
munication, and the amount of time students spent on math studies
Table 1









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample 103 113 3789 100
By Province
Province A 48 49 1611 42.5
Province B 55 64 2178 57.5
By Treatment
Control 51 56 1964 51.8
Treatment 52 57 1825 48.2
Data source: Author's survey.
conduct a heterogenous analysis of the interactions between pay-for-
percentile incentives and teacher characteristics (experience and 
monthly base salary) to understand how different t ypes o f teachers 
respond to the incentive.
Our results show that the modified p ay-for-percentile incentive 
scheme improved the average math score of treatment students by 0.10 
standard deviations. This effect was especially pronounced for students 
whose baseline math scores placed them in the bottom terciles of their 
class (0.15 SDs), although students in the middle and top terciles also 
saw small (and insignificant) gains from baseline to endline. We also 
find that these incentives worked largely by improving curricular cov-
erage and teacher behavior. Additionally, our results show no differ-
ence in how teachers with different levels of experience or base salary 
responded to the treatment. These results indicate that incentives can 
be specifically d esigned s o a s t o i mprove t he o utcomes o f lower 
achieving students.
2.4. Treatment: pay-for-percentile incentives
We introduced treated teachers to a modified pay-for-percentile
incentive program. Pay-for-percentile, introduced by Barlevy and
Neal (2012), is designed to incentivize teachers not only to maximize
effort and student learning but also to allocate effort to improving the
outcomes of all students at all points of the achievement distribution
(including low-performing students). In attempt to further increase
teacher effort on low-achieving students, the standard pay-for-percen-
tile scheme was modified so that teachers would be given 60% more
money for improvements in the achievement of students in the bottom
third of the baseline achievement distribution.
Specifically, the incentives were determined in four steps. First, we
placed all students in comparison groups according to their score on the
baseline math test. Next, students were ranked in each comparison
group by their percentile score (equal to the fraction of students in their
comparison group whom that student outperformed) on the endline
math test. Third, each teacher was ranked using a percentile perfor-
mance index determined by the average percentile rank of all students
in that teacher's class.6 Based on their average percentile rank, teachers
were allocated rewards according to the following (linear in percentile
rank) formula:
= ×Bonus R Avg PercentileRank b(99 _ )
where R is the reward for teachers ranking in the top percentile and b is
the incremental reward for each percentile rank. Teachers ranking in
the top percentile received 5000 RMB ($736), approximately equiva-
lent to a month and a half of a teacher's basic salary, and the incre-
mental reward per percentile rank was 50 RMB.
Fourth and finally, each teacher was ranked a second time using a
percentile performance index determined by the average percentile
rank of all students in the bottom third of the baseline achievement
distribution. Teachers were allocated rewards according to the same
(linear in percentile rank) formula. This time, however, teachers
ranking in the top percentile received an additional 3000 RMB ($442)
and the incremental reward per percentile rank was 30 RMB.
Although we believe that the treatment teachers were aware and
confident that performance rewards would be paid under the incentive
scheme (having seen the previous cohort of teachers receive payment),
the research team needed to ensure that teachers understood how
performance was assessed and rewards calculated using the pay-for-
percentile design. To do so, teachers assigned to the treatment group
were invited to the local prefectural seat of government following the
baseline survey, where they attended an orientation program about the
pay-for-percentile incentive program. Members of our research team, as
well as members of the local prefecture bureaus of education, in-
troduced treatment teachers to the program and helped teachers un-
derstand the program's objectives. Treatment teachers were presented
with performance pay contracts stipulating the details of the incentive
scheme. Before signing the contract with our research group, teachers
were provided with materials explaining the details of the contract and
how rewards would be calculated. Our group also gave treatment tea-
chers a two-hour training session covering the same material. To avoid
any misunderstandings of the incentive structure and contract terms
that might impact the results of the teacher incentives, we gave teachers
a short quiz to check for and correct any misconceptions. For all
treatment teachers who failed the quiz, we explained the correct an-
swers in detail and reconducted the quiz to ensure their understanding.
We then repeated this process until we were confident that all teachers
fully understood the incentive.
3 Student's household assets: whether the household owned certain common
household items. Most responses to household asset ownership variables in our
data set were dichotomous, so we used polychoric principal components ana-
lysis (PCA—Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009) to construct a standard index for
household wealth among our sample students, which we refer to as the family
asset index. We did so because recent studies suggest using household asset
indicators and PCA to construct continuous measures for household wealth is
more reliable than self-reported income (for a review, see Kolenikov and
Angeles, 2009).
4 Schools in remote locations often have trouble recruiting teachers and will
hire contract teachers from the local community. Contract teachers are usually
less qualified, and they are often paid much less than regular teachers
(Tsang M, 2003).
5 Our response rate among teachers, both in the baseline and endline, was
100%. Our response rate among students, in the baseline, was 100%. However,
there were some missing data for specific baseline variables, leading us to ex-
lude 38 students with missing variable values. Finally, at endline, the response
rate among the non-attrited students was also 100%; however, similar to the
baseline survey, we excluded 8 students at endline due to missing data for
specific variables.
6 This performance measure is essentially the fraction of contests that the
teacher's students won when compared with the students of other teachers in
the same comparison group (Barlevy and Neal, 2012).
each week). Questions assessing these secondary outcomes were 
translated and adapted from the 2012 Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) survey, a worldwide study conducted by the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in-
tended to evaluate educational systems in countries around the world 
(Appendix Table A3 – OECD, 2013). In addition, we measured curri-
cular coverage across various levels of difficulty. To measure curricular 
coverage, we gave students three examples each of “easy” math mate-
rial (from the last semester of grade 4), three examples of “medium” 
math material (from the first semester of grade 5), and three examples 
of “hard” math material (from the second semester of grade 5). For each 
type of material (easy, medium and hard), students were asked to look 
at the three examples and report whether their teacher had exposed 
them to this material.
In the third block, we collected data on student, family, teacher and 
school characteristics. Students were asked to report their individual 
and family characteristics, including gender, age, boarding status 
(whether or not a student lives at school), father's education level, 
mother's education level and family asset value.3 We also collected 
information on the characteristics of the math teachers in our sample 
classes by interviewing teachers individually about their teaching ex-
perience and monthly base salary. In addition, we interviewed the 
principal of each school to find the total number of students and tea-
chers, as well as the number of contract teachers in each sample 
school.4
2.3. Tests for balance and attrition bias
After the baseline survey, we tested the control and treatment 
groups for balance. The characteristics of all students, teachers, and 
schools in our sample are described in Table 2. Columns 1 and 3 show 
the mean of the control and treatment groups. Column 5 shows the 
difference between the two groups. When we examine the balance of 
the control and treatment groups, we find that ten of 12 variables are 
balanced. Two variables (student gender and mother's education level) 
are unbalanced (both at 5% significance), however, the differences are 
small in magnitude. In our statistical analysis, we control for these 
variables.
Student attrition between the baseline and endline was relatively 
low in our sample. Attrition was 10.14% in the treatment group and 
9.83% in the control group (Appendix Table A1). Appendix Table A2 
shows that there is no significant differential attrition between control 
and treatment groups in our sample. After attrition, our sample in-
cluded 1,711 students in the control group and 1,640 students in the 
treatment group, totaling 3,411 students5.
2.5. Statistical methods
In this paper we use an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression to
analyze the impact of the pay-for-percentile incentive treatment on
student achievement and its transmission mechanisms. We perform this
regression on the full sample, as well for terciles based on student
academic performance at baseline, in order to compare outcomes of
students in the bottom, middle and top of each class. The OLS regres-
sion model is as follows:
= + + + + +Score endline T Score baseline X Z_ _ij ij ij ij c ij1 2 ‘ 1 1 1 (1)
where Score endline_ ij is the endline standardized math score for student
i in school j, and Tij is the treatment variable (equal to 1 if the student is
in the treatment group and equal to 0 if the student is in the control
group), which makes β1 the parameter of interest. Score baseline_ ij is the
baseline standardized math score for student i in school j; Xij‘ is a vector
of control variables Z1 is the coefficient of the control variables; Φ1c is a
set of county (strata) fixed effects; and ɛ1ij is the residual term. In all
specifications, Xij‘ j includes the two waves of baseline achievement
scores as well as the two unbalanced variables (student gender and
mother's education level). We also estimate treatment effects with an
expanded set of controls, including student age, student gender, parent
educational attainment (mother and father), household asset index,
class size, teacher experience, and teacher base salary.
To examine the transmission mechanisms underlying changes in
math scores, we also estimate the effects of the treatment on secondary
outcomes. To do this, we use the following OLS model:
= + + + + +Y T Score baseline X Z_ij ij ij ij c ij1 2 ‘ 2 2 2 (2)
where Yij denotes a series of secondary outcomes, including student
attitudes towards math and teacher teaching practices; Φ2c is a set of
county (strata) fixed effects; and ɛ1ij is the residual term.
In the analysis, we also estimate the heterogeneous effects of tea-
cher characteristics on student achievement scores. To do this, we run
regressions examining interactions between the pay-for-percentile in-
centive and the teacher characteristics measured at baseline. Our het-
erogeneous effects model is:
= + + + + + +Score T Score baseline T X X Z_ *endlineij ij ij ij ij ij c ij1 2 3 ‘ ‘ 3 3 3
(3)
where T X*ij ij‘ is the interaction between the treatment and teacher
characteristics (teaching experience and monthly base salary), and γ3
indicates the heterogeneous treatment effect. Φ3c is a set of county
(strata) fixed effect, and ɛ3ij is the residual term.
3. Results
3.1. Average Impacts of Modified Pay-for-Percentile Incentives on
Achievement
Table 3 reports estimates for the impact of the modified pay-for-per-
centile incentive treatment on student achievement. As specified in our
statistical methods above, we report estimates using Eq. (1) and two dif-
ferent sets of controls: a limited set of controls (controlling for baseline
standardized math exam scores and strata fixed effects) and an expanded
set of controls (student gender, age, parental educational attainment, a
household asset index, teacher experience, and teacher base salary). We
find that the treatment increased student achievement by 0.14 SD using
the limited set of controls (significant at the 5% level—Table 3, Row 1,
Column 1) and by 0.10 SD using the expanded set of controls (significant
at the 10% level—Table 3, Row 1, Column 3).
To understand the differential effects of the modified pay-for-percen-
tile incentive scheme on students at different points along the achievement
distribution, we divide students into terciles (low, middle and high-per-
forming) based on baseline math score (Table 4). When we examine dis-
tributional effects across baseline achievement for the full sample, we find
that the pay-for-percentile incentive had the largest effect on students at
the bottom of the distribution (low-performing students). Math scores for
these students increased by 0.15 SDs (Table 4, Rows 1, Column 1), sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level. The pay-for-percentile incentive also
had modest positive effects (positive point estimates) on students in the
middle and top of the distribution: scores for middle- and high-performing
students increased by 0.03 SDs and 0.10 SDs, respectively. Although, these
effects are not statistically significant even at the 10% level, the positive
coefficient values indicate that the positive and significant effects on the
lowest performing students do not come at the expense of middle- or high-
performing students.7
3.2. Impacts of modified pay-for-percentile incentives on secondary
outcomes
Table 5 presents the results of our analysis examining the effects of
Control Mean SD Treatment Mean SD Difference t-values n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(1)-(3) (6) (7)
Panel A. Student Characteristics
Baseline Standardized Math Score 0.00 1.00 0.03 1.00 -0.02 -0.23 3411
Gender (1=male; 0=female) 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50 -0.03** -2.25 3411
Age (years) 10.81 0.94 10.84 0.96 0.05 0.79 3411
Family Asset Index -0.05 0.97 0.05 1.03 0.01 0.10 3411
Boarding (1=yes; 0=no) 0.21 0.40 0.22 0.41 -0.03 -0.72 3411
Father Attended Secondary School (1=yes; 0=no) 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.01 0.59 3411
Mother Attended Secondary School (1=yes; 0=no) 0.08 0.27 0.13 0.33 0.04** 2.37 3411
Panel B. Teacher Characteristics
Teaching Experience (1= <10 years; 0= ≥10 years) 0.61 0.48 0.63 0.50 -0.13 -1.41 113
Monthly Base Salary (1= ≥median; 0= <median) 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.50 0.07 1.03 113
Panel C. School Characteristics
Number of Students 427.80 523.83 384.94 338.37 -20.16 -0.28 103
Number of Teachers 30.75 23.02 31.6 21.34 0.57 0.14 103
Number of Contract Teachers 2.59 5.51 5.25 16.13 3.30 1.25 103
Data source: author's baseline survey.
NOTE: Column 1 and column 3 show the mean in the control and treatment group, while columns 2 and 4 show standard deviations for the control and treatment
groups, respectively. Column 5 shows the difference between control mean and treatment mean. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
7 We also use nonparametric analysis to examine student achievement growth
over the course of the academic year based on student baseline achievement.
The results are largely consistent with that of Tables 3 and 4: overall, students
in the treatment group have greater improvement in academic achievement
compared with students in the control group, with the greatest impacts ap-
pearing for treatment students with the lowest baseline academic performance.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics and balance check at baseline.
the modified pay-for-percentile incentive scheme on teacher teaching
practices and student attitudes towards math. We find significant im-
pacts on teaching practices. Specifically, treatment students reported
that teachers covered both more easy-level curriculum content (sig-
nificant at the 1% level) and hard-level curriculum content (significant
at the 5% level) compared to students in the control group (Table 5,
Row 1, Columns 5-7). Changes in the amounts of medium-level material
covered were not significantly different.
Furthermore, we find that, compared with control teachers, teachers
in the treatment group invested more time and energy in improving
student outcomes. Treatment students reported higher levels of teacher
Dependent Variable Endline Standardized Math Score
(1) (2) (3)
Pay-for-Percentile Incentive 0.14** 0.09* 0.10*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)




Gender (1=male; 0=female) -0.00
(0.03)
Boarding (1=yes; 0=no) -0.02
(0.04)








Family Asset Index -0.01
(0.02)
Teacher Monthly Base Salary (1=higher




Teacher Teaching Experience (1=lower




Strata (county) Fixed Effect No Yes Yes
Constant 0.03 0.20*** 1.43***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.25)
Observations 3,411 3,411 3,411
R-squared 0.405 0.427 0.437
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in
parentheses. All tests account for clustering at the school level. *, ** and ***
indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 4
Distributional Effects of pay-for-percentile incentives by baseline math scores.
Dependent Variable Pay for Percentile Incentive Effect on:
Bottom 1/3 Middle 1/3 Top 1/3
(1) (2) (3)








Student Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Teacher Characteristics Yes Yes Yes






Observations 1,282 1,130 999
R-squared 0.21 0.11 0.21
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in
parentheses.All tests account for clustering at the school level. *, ** and ***




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Impact of pay-for-percentile incentives on student achievement.
4. Discussion and conclusion
The purpose of an educational system is to teach all children
(Fullan, 2012), and teachers play a key role in ensuring that all students
are learning (Hannum and Park, 2002; McLaughlin and Talbert, 2006).
However, under China's current educational system, rural teachers tend
to give preferential attention to high-achieving students at the expense
of low-achieving students (Bo et al., 2010). Although the Teacher
Performance Pay policy implemented in 2009 aims to motivate teachers
to improve the outcomes of all students, including low-performing
students (MOE, 2008), research in rural China has continued to docu-
ment that teachers tend to neglect low-performing students and give
greater attention to higher-performing students (Li, 2014; Wang and
Yu, 2011; Jiang et al., 2016).
One reason for the continued neglect of underperforming students is
that there is no clear system for evaluating the performance of teachers
to determine performance pay (Ren and Luo, 2015; Fan and Fu, 2011;
Mi and Dai, 2011). Theoretical and empirical studies of teacher in-
centives have suggested that the pay-for-percentile incentive design can
effectively motivate teachers to improve the outcomes of students
across the achievement distribution (Neal, 2011; Barlevy and
Neal, 2012; Loyalka et al., 2019; Gilligan et al., 2018; Mbiti et al.,
2018). Yet can a modified pay-for-percentile incentive design improve
the academic outcomes of underperforming students specifically?
According to our results, in fact, we do find that a modified pay-for-
percentile scheme (in which incentives exist for all students but are
larger for improving the achievement of lower achieving students)
significantly increases the achievement of those students. Low-per-
forming students in our treatment group saw significantly greater im-
provement from baseline to endline (0.15 SD) in contrast to middle- and
high-performing treatment students. Our findings also show that im-
provements in the outcomes of low-performing students did not come at
the expense of middle- or high-performing students: the point estimates
for students in the middle and top terciles of the baseline achievement
distribution were also positive (0.03 and 0.1 SD, respectively) albeit
statistically insignificant.
Why might pay-for-percentile incentives be effective at increasing
the scores of students who are at the bottom of the academic achieve-
ment distribution compared to students in the control schools? One
plausible reason is that the modified pay-for-percentile scheme suc-
cessfully incentivized teachers to pay more attention to students who
scored in the bottom tercile of their class. In control schools, teachers
were given performance pay as stipulated by the Teacher Performance
Pay policy, but there is no clear method or performance assessment.
This left schools to rely on their own methods of performance assess-
ment, which may have reinforced the status quo of using exam scores as
a metric of teacher performance and incentivized teachers to focus on
high-performing students and neglect low-performing ones
(Jiang, 2011; Jiang et al., 2016). Teacher incentivized under the
modified pay-for-percentile design, however, not only received rewards
for improvements in the performance of all students along the baseline
achievement distribution, but also received additional rewards for im-
provements in the performance of low-achieving students specifically.
If treated teachers believed that focusing on the outcomes of low-
achieving students would bring them greater benefits under the in-
centive scheme, it is not surprising that we see greater improvement
among low-achieving students.
It is noteworthy that the effects of the pay-for-percentile incentive
on the lowest-performing students did not come at the expense of mid-
performing and high-performing students. This shows that the modified
pay-for-percentile program did not encourage teachers to strategically
allocate effort to the low-performing students given the larger pay off.
Instead, the evidence demonstrates that the modified pay-for-percentile
program increased teacher effort and efficiency for all students.
Our analysis of secondary outcomes further supports this reasoning.
Our results show that the incentive scheme worked largely by in-
centivizing teachers to spend more time covering easy and hard curri-
cula. This finding is similar to the results of Loyalka et al (2019), who
found that improvements in student outcomes were correlated to in-
creased curricular coverage. However, pay-for-percentile incentivized
Table 6
Heterogeneous effects of pay-for-percentile incentives by baseline teacher
characteristics.
Dependent Variable Endline Standardized Math Score
(1) (2)
Pay-for-Percentile Incentive 0.03 0.15
(0.08) (0.09)
Baseline Standardized Math Score 0.59*** 0.59***
(0.02) (0.02)
Teacher Teaching Experience (1=less than 10
years; 0=greater than 10 years)
-0.14 -0.07
(0.10) (0.09)
Teacher Monthly Base Salary (1=higher than the
median; 0=lower than the median)
-0.13 -0.06
(0.08) (0.10)
Treatment*Teacher Teaching Experience 0.12
(0.10)
Treatment*Teacher Monthly Base Salary -0.11
(0.11)
Student Characteristics Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes
Teacher Characteristics Yes Yes





Notes: Shows estimated coefficients and standard errors obtained by estimating
regressions analogous to Model 1, but adding the baseline variable of interest and
interactions with incentive treatment dummies. Each regression controls for
baseline standardized math exam scores, strata (county) fixed effects as well as
student gender, age, parent educational attainment, a household asset index, tea-
cher experience and teacher base salary. All standard errors account for clustering
at the school level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
care compared to control students, (Table 5, Row 1, Column 10), and 
treatment students were also more likely to say that their teachers 
communicated with them (Table 5, Row 1, Column 12). Additionally, 
students in the treatment group reported lower teacher absence rates 
and more math homework (Table 5, Row 1, Column 9).
In contrast, we find little evidence that the treatment affected stu-
dent attitudes towards math. Effects on indices representing math self-
concept, math anxiety, intrinsic and instrumental motivation in math, 
and student time spent on math are all statistically insignificant 
(Table 5, Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 8). Overall, our data indicate that the 
treatment worked largely through changes in curricular coverage and 
changes in the behaviors and attitudes of teachers. We can therefore 
infer that the incentive led teachers to give more attention and con-
sideration to students, especially low-performing students.
3.3. Heterogeneous effects b y t eacher characteristics
The results of our heterogeneous analysis are reported in Table 6. In 
accordance with our pre-analysis plan, we focus the analysis of het-
erogeneous effects on two teacher characteristics: teaching experience 
and base salary. We do this because, in theory, these characteristics 
may affect how teachers respond to incentives and alternative ways of 
defining t eacher p erformance. However, o ur r esults s how t hat there 
were no differences i n t he e ffects of  th e modified pay-for-percentile 
scheme on teachers with different l evels o f t eaching e xperience or 
monthly base salary (Table 6, Row 5, Column 1, Row 6, Column 2). In 
other words, for all teachers across the distribution of teaching ex-
perience and base salary, the treatment created similar motivation to 
improve student achievement.
which may lead to more consistent improvements in student achieve-
ment.
We do acknowledge one limitation of this study. Because our data
on secondary outcomes was only collected at endline, we are unable to
establish a causal relationship between the incentive, the secondary
outcomes, and student academic achievement. This means that al-
though our results identify the causal effect of the teacher incentive on
student academic achievement, we cannot identify with certainty the
mechanism through which this occurs. Future research should make use
of longtitundinal dynamic panel data to verify the causal chain through
which the incentive impacts student achievement.
Given our findings, we recommend that Chinese policymakers im-
plement a broad pilot study of pay-for-percentile incentives in schools
across rural China to determine whether and how to incorporate a pay-
for-percentile program into existing policy. That the pay-for-percentile
incentive scheme (with and without modifications to help teachers pay
more attention to low-achieving students) has shown positive impacts
on student academic achievement in repetitive use indicates that this
incentive design may be effectively scaled up to improve the academic
outcomes of China's rural students and treat issues of teacher neglect.
Future research should examine the effectiveness of pay-for-percentile
in rural schools in different regions of China to assess the effectiveness
and scalability of this incentive scheme and its potential to be im-
plemented as a part of the Teacher Performance Pay policy.
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Tables A1, A2, A3.
Table A1
Sample attrition.
Number of students at Baseline Number of students at Endline Attrition Attrition Rate
"Pay-for-Percentile" Group 1825 1640 185 10.14%
Control Group 1964 1771 193 9.83%
All Sample 3789 3411 378 9.98%
Data source: author's survey.
Table A2










Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in this regression
is a dummy variable indicating a student was absent from the
endline survey. The regression controls for strata(county) fixed
effects. Standard errors account for clustering at the school level.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
teachers in Loyalka et al. (2019)’s study covered more medium and 
hard material, compared to easy and hard material reported by students 
in our study. It is possible that teachers in our study covered more easy 
curriculum content to improve the academic performance of low-per-
forming students specifically. That teachers in the treatment group of 
this study spent more time teaching easy curriculum content is also the 
most likely reason for why we find that students at the bottom of the 
baseline achievement distribution improved more than students in the 
middle and top of the distribution.
Additionally, treatment teachers invested more energy and time in 
the outcomes of students compared to control teachers. Compared to 
students in the control group, treatment students reported that their 
teachers showed greater care for students and increased communication 
with students, and that their teachers also had fewer absences and gave 
more homework. These findings d iffer fr om th ose of  ot her studies 
(Loyalka et al., 2019; Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer , 2010; Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman, 2011), who found that increased incentives for teachers 
had little impact on classroom practices. Furthermore, we find that the 
modified pay-for-percentile incentive structure incentivized all teachers 
regardless of experience or base salary.
Our findings verify that in practice, the pay-for-percentile incentive 
scheme can be modified to close achievement gaps in primary school. 
That both our study and the Loyalka et al. (2019) study returned po-
sitive results indicates that pay-for-percentile is a robust treatment to 
improve student outcomes, and may be successfully replicated in other 
parts of China. Our results also demonstrate that the pay-for-percentile 
incentive scheme can effectively address i ssues o f t eacher neglect of 
underperforming students in rural China and motivate teachers to 
change both their curricular coverage and their classroom practices in 
order to improve student outcomes. Additionally, unlike other existing 
incentives (such as the promotion system in China–W en-jing et al., 
2010; Chu et al., 2015; Karachiwalla and Park, 2017), this incentive 
design motivates teachers regardless of their experience and salary,
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